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DUTY TO WARN SOCIAL GUEST
One Christmas night a Mrs. Foggin and her daughter-in-law
were carrying Christmas wrappings and boxes from the latter's
house to a trash receptacle. The dark backyard through which
they walked was enclosed by a fence with a gate that opened
outward. The daughter-in-law held the gate open for Mrs. Fog-
gin to precede her through it, at which point Mrs. Foggin tripped
over a plank which was painted a dark color and nailed across
the bottom of the gateway, extending six or eight inches above
the ground. The suit that arose from Mrs. Foggin's injuries due
to this fall' afforded the Louisiana Supreme Court an oppor-
tunity to affirm the rule established by the intermediate courts,
unique to Louisiana, that a social guest is considered an "invitee"
to whom the landowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable
care for his safety.2 The court defined this duty further as one
requiring the occupant to warn the guest of a hidden or con-
cealed peril. The daughter-in-law's tacit invitation for the
plaintiff to pass through the gate meant that plaintiff could
reasonably assume that she could walk through safely, negating
any assumption of risk on her part.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PLEDGE
The necessity of delivery as an essential requirement for a
valid pledge' has been the subject of discussion several times in
recent years. 2 Generally, the matter is considered as of the time
of the making of the purported pledge agreement. There is no
reason why the parties could not agree to a later delivery, in
which event the pledge is only perfected at the time of such
delivery. In Steadman v. Action Fin. Corp.,4 the parties signed
1. Foggin v. General Guaranty Ins. Co., 250 La. 347, 195 So.2d 636 (1967),
remanded for further proceedings on the issue of quantum.
2. In all other American jurisdictions, the social guest is held to be a
mere licensee, to whom a lesser standard of care is owed. See Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 598 (1952); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 60, at 388 (3d ed. 1964).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3133, 3152 (1870).
2. 18 LA. L. REV. 50 (1957); 33 TuL. L. REV. 74 (1958); 26 LA. L. Rlv. 182
(1965).
3. Sambola v. Fandison, 178 So. 276 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
4. 197 So.2d 424 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), writ refused, 199 So.2d 918 (La.
1967).
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an agreement which purported to be a present pledge and to
be accompanied by immediate delivery. Actually, no delivery
was made at that time, but the trial judge held that a subsequent
passive surrender of possession constituted delivery and per-
fected the pledge. In the court of appeal, the same circuit (with
the same judge writing the opinion) that clarified the delivery
problem in the case of Powers v. Motors Securities Co.5 reversed
the trial judge on this point, and held that "since there was no
delivery pursuant to the written agreement there was no
pledge." The circumstance that the subsequent passive surren-
der occurred in the process of repossession after default, for
purposes of sale, "convinced us the taking was unlawful."7
ATTORNEY's PRIVILEGE ON JUDGMENT
Louisiana law permits a contingent fee contract between
attorney and client8 and provides for the attorney a special privi-
lege on any judgment obtained.9 In Palmer & Palmer v. Stire,0
a money judgment was rendered, and it was inscribed as a
judicial mortgage against the judgment debtor. Some time later,
the judgment creditor and judgment debtor entered into a com-
promise (which was paid), and the judicial mortgage was
erased upon the written authorization of the judgment creditor.
The present suit by the attorney for reinstatement of the judicial
mortgage, with priority over other intervening recorded mort-
gages, was dismissed. It is refreshing to read an opinion based
entirely on Civil Code articles together with statutory provisions
and their legislative history-not a single case is cited.
Three issues merit discussion. The first is Civil Code article
3371, which comes directly from the Code Napoleon" and pro-
vides that mortgage inscriptions are erased by consent of "the
parties interested and having capacity for that purpose." This
is not qualified as "any" party or as "all" parties; neither is there
description of the word "interested." The additional requirement
of "having capacity for that purpose" is explained by Planiol as
meaning that "every creditor having the capacity to receive pay-
5. 168 So.2d 922 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), noted in 26 LA. L. REV. 182 (1965).
6. 197 So.2d at 427.
7. Id.
& LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950).
9. Id. 9:5001.
10. 195 So.2d 706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967), writ refused, 197 So.2d 899
(La. 1967).
11. See LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, CompiZed Edition of the Civil Codes
of Lou4siana art. 3371 at 1847 (1942).
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ment of the credit and to give a discharge to the debtor can
consent, after payment, to the erasure of the mortgage."'1 2 The
two parts of this phrase are linked by the conjunctive "and" so
that the latter part is also a limitation on the first. Accordingly,
there is no doubt that the judgment creditor, having capacity
to receive payment and discharge the debtor, can validly
authorize and instruct the erasure of the accompanying mort-
gage. Furthermore, after payment and extinction of the prin-
cipal obligation, the accessory 8 mortgage is automatically of
no effect neither as between the parties nor as against third
persons.
The question posed by the principal case is whether the
attorney qualifies under article 3371 to authorize the erasure
of a judicial mortgage inscription based upon the judgment ob-
tained for his client. Since granting a mortgage is tantamount
to an alienation and requires that kind of capacity,'14 the giving
up of a mortgage should require the same capacity. In the ab-
sence of an agreement between client and attorney giving the
latter authority to receive payment or to cancel a mortgage,
it would not appear that he has this authority. Accordingly, it
is hard to agree with the court's statement: "We do not believe
that the signature of both the attorney for a judgment creditor
and the judgment creditor himself is necessary on an authoriza-
tion to cancel a judicial mortgage, but believe that this right to
obtain cancellation is coextensive in both the judgment creditor
and his attorney."'15 (Emphasis added.) The mortgagee has a
real right on the property; 16 the attorney's privilege does not
give him the same right.
The second issue, in itself, adequately supports the court's
decision. The statute which authorizes contingent fee contracts
also provides that either party may prevent the other from
making any individual settlement or compromise without the
other, by filing the contract with the clerk of court and serving
a copy on the other party. If the attorney had done this, he could
have prevented his client's compromise and mortgage cancella-
tion. This legislation was originally enacted as part of the same
statute which created the attorney's privilege on the judgment,17
12. 2 PLANIOL, TRAMT ELUMENTAIRE Dn DROIT CIVIL no 3063 (11th ed. 1939).
13. LA. CIWL CODE arts. 3284, 3285 (1870).
14. Id. art. 3300.
15. 195 So.2d 706, 710-11 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
16. LA. CVIL CODE art. 3282 (1870).
17. See 195 So.2d 706, 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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and these provisions are in pari materia, so that the filing with
the clerk of court was intended as the implementation and pro-
tection of the privilege. Since the attorney had not done so, the
erasure was good and that was the end of the mortgage.
The third issue stems from an observation quoted from the
trial court's reasons for judgment, namely, that "reliance upon
the public records and the law of registry would be greatly
hobbled"'8 if the attorney could get the judicial mortgage rein-
stated after two other proper mortgages had been duly recorded.
If this implies that the intervention of the rights of third parties
is material to the decision, it would be misleading because the
same result should obtain even if there are no other recorded
rights against the property.
BUILDING CONTRACT PRIVMEGES
With a statute as complex as the Building Contract Law,19
it is not surprising that there appears to be no end to the prob-
lems and the litigation. However, it is not often that one finds
the architect's privilege involved. In Capital Bank & Trust Co.
v. Broussard Paint & Wallpaper Co.,20 there was a priority dis-
pute between the mortgagee and certain lienholders including
the architect. The statute provides that the architect's privilege
against the property is "of equal rank with the contractor."'1
The two principal kinds of situations contemplated by the
statute are (1) where a contract and appropriate bond have
been recorded (R.S. 9:4801-4802) and (2) where there is no
written contract or it has not been recorded (R.S. 9:4812). In
the first situation, the contractor may have a privilege against
the property; but in the latter, the statute does not provide a
privilege for the contractor, and it has been held that he has
none.22 If the architect's privilege is of equal rank with the con-
tractor's, then in the fact situation which is governed by R.S.
9:4812 the architect is no better off.
In the case at bar, the court gave judgment in favor of the
mortgagee on the basis of the statutory provision that the arch-
itect's privilege "affects third persons only from the date of
recordation. ' '2 3 This takes for granted that the architect did have
18. Id. at 709.
19. LA. R.S. 9:4801-4820 (1950), as amended.
20. 198 So.2d 204 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
21. LA. R.S. 9:4813 (1950).
22. Officer v. Cambre, 194 So. 441 (La. App. lst Cir. 1940).
23. LA. R.S. 9:4813 (1950).
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a privilege against the property but was outranked by the mort-
gagee, and does not answer the question whether the architect
is really given a privilege (upon proper recordation of claim)
where there has been no recordation of the principal contract.
In the examination of this question, it should be noted that
R.S. 9:4813 (architect's privilege is of equal rank with the con-
tractor) incorporates the language of Act 208 of 1926, section 13,
whereas many of the other sections have gone through several
more recent amendments. For the creation and preservation of
the architect's privilege, the statute provides that "it may be re-
corded not later than thirty days after registry . . . of notice of
acceptance by the owner of the said work, or notice of default. '24
This language corresponds to the language used in R.S. 9:4802
which contemplates the situation where a contract and bond
have been recorded in the first place, and it can be concluded
that the architect's privilege was, in the original legislative
intent, to exist only in this type of situation. Where there is no
recorded contract, the original statutory language fixed the
delay for recordation of claims from "the last delivery of all
material upon the said property or the last performance of all
services or labor upon the same."'
Unless architects (and consulting engineers) can make sure
to be paid early in the program of construction for which there
is no recorded contract and bond, they may find themselves
without the security protection of a privilege against the prop-
erty.
MORTGAGES
Generally, the problems of the mortgagee are either with the
mortgagor or with third persons who claim a competing right
or interest in the mortgaged property. A somewhat unusual
situation presented itself in the cace of Stamper v. Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co.,26 where the mortgagee's complaint was
against a third party who had prejudiced his security by alleged
damage to the property in connection with the performance of
a contract with the property owner. The suit was instituted as
an action in tort, and under the circumstances the court found
there was no fault and therefore no liability. The fact situation,
24. Id.
25. La. Acts 1926, No. 298, § 12; LA. R.S. 9:4812 (before amendments)
(1950).
26. 187 So.2d 134 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 187 So.2d 438.
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however, evokes the question of how far the mortgagee may go
for the protection or making good of his security against the
acts of a third person, irrespective of the tort issue.
In the absence of fraud or other rescindable act, the mort-
gagee cannot undo the acts of the mortgagor which depreciate
the value of the property, such as the sale and removal of acces-
sories or equipment. If the owner had a garage demolished with
a view to putting in a swimming pool (which was never done),
the mortgagee cannot force him to replace the garage. On the
other hand, if the house itself is sold and removed, the mort-
gagee's right of pursuit would be effective because the building
has not ceased to be an immovable. Of course, the mortgagee
who has advance knowledge of such intentions can enjoin the
mortgagor from depreciating the value of the security or com-
mitting "waste."2 7 However, he cannot hold the owner separately
liable after the damage has been caused. There is no purpose in
such a liability because the mortgagor is personally liable for
the principal indebtedness.
The case being examined holds that a third person is not
liable for damage or depreciation of the security by reason of
appropriate (non-negligent) acts in the performance of a valid
contract with the owner. The negative pregnant in the decision
is that, if the damage or depreciation is due to the third per-
son's negligence, he would be liable in tort to the mortgagee.
This leaves two questions: (1) the negligent third party's liabil-
ity to the property owner, and (2) the mortgagee's right to
enjoin such acts which he has reason to believe will be preju-
dicial to his security.
On the first point, there can be no doubt that the negligent
third party is liable, either ex contractu or ex delicto or both,
to the owner. If he has already paid the owner, can the mort-
gagee also hold him liable again for the damage done to his
security? Such a conclusion is hardly palatable, yet it would
seem to follow if the decision in the principal case is taken to
mean that the mortgagee has an independent and separate right
of action in tort against the negligent third party.
On the second point, it is clearer that the mortgagee has an
independent and distinct right to prevent prejudice to his securi-
ty because this is his own interest which he seeks to protect,
27. Cf. IA. Cvu CODE arts. 750, 3397(1) (1870); Federal Land Bank v.
Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So. 374 (1934).
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 345
and if he can prove his allegation within the established pro-
cedural forms, he should be entitled to an appropriate injunc-
tion. This is on the basis of preventing a harm which is not a
tort but which would cause damage by the depreciation of the
mortgagee's security through the fact of the third person's action
no matter how free from negligence or fault.
Reverting now to the principal case, it may be questioned
whether the tort issue is appropriate under the circumstances.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Since 1948, 28 the law provides that a stock of merchandise
can be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage,29 with the re-
quirement that such a chattel mortgage "shall describe the same
as all of a particular class or classes or grade or kind or type
or species or dimensions or as a stock of merchandise to be kept
at a certain location."30 This provision for a simplified form of
inventory financing does not seem to have produced the bene-
ficial results contemplated. Apart from the absence of a mort-
gagee's traditional right of pursuit, and the displacement of a
future vendor whose lien is outranked before it comes into
existence (and who, therefore, will not sell on credit to the
mortgagor), the Bulk Sales Law3 ' has severely cut down the
effectiveness of the chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise.
In Fidelity Credit Co. v. Winkle,3 2 the chattel mortgage
covered "all of mortgagor's stock of merchandise composed of
Liquefied Petroleum gas ranges, refrigerators . . . and other
equipment, parts and appliances now located at . . . complete
with all present and future attachments, accessories, replace-
ments and additions." Since there had been no compliance with
the notice requirements of the Bulk Sales Law, the other credi-
tors claimed that the chattel mortgagee was liable as a receiver
for the fair value of the goods "transferred."3 3 Another section
of the statute defines transfers under this act to include "trans-
fers in payment of debt, in whole or in part, pledges, mortgages,
sales, exchanges .... ,,34 (Emphasis added.)
28. La. Acts 1948, No. 474.
29. LA. R.S. 9:5351 (1950).
30. Id. 9:5352.
31. Id. 9:2961-2968.
32. 191 So.2d 716 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), reversed, 202 So.2d 280 (La. 1967).
33. LA. R.S. 9:2963 (1950).
34. Id. 9:2965.
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The court of appeal sustained the chattel mortgage by inter-
preting the Bulk Sales Law definition of "transfer" as one in
which the transferee has actually received the property (or
obtains the proceeds of its sale). The Supreme Court reversed,
apparently applying the "plain meaning" rule of statutory inter-
pretation that the statute specifically includes a mortgage within
its definition of transfers covered by this legislation, and it is in
the very nature of a mortgage as a security device that the
property remains in the possession of the mortgagor.
Although the Supreme Court decision was made by a divided
court (4 to 3), it would seem that the majority's interpretation
of the original legislative intent of the statute is probably correct
because the court of appeal's qualification of transfer would read
the word "mortgage" out of the definition entirely. On the other
hand, neither can it be said that the original legislative intent
was to include a chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise
because this was not authorized until 1948. It can hardly be
stated with absolute assurance just what the legislature did
intend when the word "mortgage" was originally included in
the definition of "transfers" under the Bulk Sales Act. Under
the circumstances, the plain meaning of the statute is not dis-
placed by any more sophisticated interpretation.
It has already been noted that "Louisiana's position is unique.
The Bulk Sales Act found in Article 6 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is expressly made inapplicable to security transactions
in our sister states."3 5 The basic policy issues, as illustrated in
the facts of the case being discussed, call for serious and careful
legislative reconsideration.
PRESCRIPTION
Frederick W. Ellis*
AcQuisirrvE
In Zeringue v. Blouin,' possession of a part was deemed
possession of the whole of contiguous lands described in the
deed of a good faith possessor, although no part of the land
35. Note, 15 LA. BAR J. 232 (1967), referring to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
art. 6, § 103(1), and art. 9, § 111 (see also Comment) (1962).
1. 192 So.2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 250 La. 100, 194 So.2d
98 (1967). The case did not involve any facts to invoke well-settled juris-
prudence that the rule is inapplicable to noncontiguous parcels and to any
situation where the true owner against whom prescription is claimed is
himself in constructive possession by actual possession of a contiguous part
of his estate.
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